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
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Stimulus Representation and the Timing of Reward-Prediction Errors in Models of the Dopamine System

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The phasic firing of dopamine neurons has been theorized to encode a reward-prediction error as formalized by the temporal-difference (TD) algorithm in reinforcement learning. Most TD models of dopamine have assumed a stimulus representation, known as the complete serial compound, in which each moment in a trial is distinctly represented. We introduce a more realistic temporal stimulus representation for the TD model. In our model, all external stimuli, including rewards, spawn a series of internal microstimuli, which grow weaker and more diffuse over time. These microstimuli are used by the TD learning algorithm to generate predictions of future reward. This new stimulus representation injects temporal generalization into the TD model and enhances correspondence between model and data in several experiments, including those when rewards are omitted or received early. This improved fit mostly derives from the absence of large negative errors in the new model, suggesting that dopamine alone can encode the full range of TD errors in these situations.

1 Introduction ---

For any organism, learning to find good things (rewards) while avoiding bad things (punishers) is a key mechanism for survival. In the mammalian brain, much reward-related information passes through dopaminergic pathways. For example, dopamine neurons produce response bursts to unexpected rewards, as well as to cues that reliably predict upcoming rewards. This pattern of phasic firing has been interpreted as encoding a reward-prediction error corresponding to the temporal-difference (TD) error prominent in reinforcement-learning algorithms (Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). This error, in turn, is




Figure 1: Summary of empirical data and simulation results. Empirical data from monkey dopamine neurons (left column), simulation results from the TD model with complete-serial-compound stimulus representation (middle column), and results from our new TD model with microstimuli (right column). From top to bottom, data and simulations are presented for unpredicted rewards, predicted rewards, and the omission of predicted rewards. See text for full simulation details. (Data are from Schultz et al., 1997. Reprinted with permission.) In empirical data figures, CS = conditioned, reward-predicting stimulus and R = reward; dots represent firing of individual neurons; and the bars are a histogram of that firing.

important for learning predictions of future rewards and selecting appropriate responses. Though the exact role of dopamine in reward is still debated (for an alternative viewpoint, see Berridge, 2007), the reinforcement-learning model of dopaminergic function has helped yield numerous insights into learning and decision making (Montague, 2006; Montague, Hyman, & Cohen, 2004) as well as disorders like Parkinson's disease (Frank, Seeberger, & O'Reilly, 2004; Shohamy, Myers, Grossman, Sage, & Gluck, 2005) and drug addiction (Redish, 2004; Redish, Jensen, Johnson, & Kurth-Nelson, 2007). In this letter, we extend these TD models to include a more realistic temporal stimulus representation. This new representation suggests how temporal generalization should occur, thereby generating testable empirical predictions as well as considerably improving the TD model's fit with existent dopamine data.

The hypothesis that midbrain dopamine neurons encode a reward-prediction or TD error was inspired by three key properties of these neurons. Figure 1 illustrates these properties of dopamine neurons along

with corresponding simulations from the basic TD model and our new microstimulus TD model. First, following unpredicted rewards, dopamine neurons show a burst of responding, and there is a strong, positive reward-prediction error in the models (top row). Second, when a neutral cue reliably predicts the upcoming reward, the increased firing after the now-expected reward gradually disappears, and instead, a response burst begins to follow the earliest cue for that reward (middle row). Third, after learning, if an expected reward is omitted, there is a decrease in the firing rates of the dopamine neurons and a corresponding negative TD error in the models around the time when reward would ordinarily have been received (bottom row; data are from Schultz et al., 1997).

All TD models of dopamine work by assuming that the system learns a value for each time step in a trial. These TD models attempt to learn an estimate of the true value V^* , which is equal to the expected cumulative sum of discounted future reward:

$$V_t^* = E \left[\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{k-1} r_{t+k} \right], \quad (1.1)$$

where r_t is the reward at time step t and γ is a discount factor that weights immediate rewards more heavily than distant rewards. This ideal value is the cumulative sum of all future discounted rewards and thus serves as a prediction of expected future reward at a given time point. With perfect knowledge of the environment, including state transition probabilities and the reward function, the value could be calculated directly through dynamic programming techniques (Sutton & Barto, 1998). In the absence of such information, however, the value must be estimated. One method for estimating the value is the TD algorithm, whereby an error term δ_t is calculated based on the *temporal difference* of the current discounted value (γV_t) and the previous value (V_{t-1}), taking into account the reward received along the way (r_t):

$$\delta_t = r_t + \gamma V_t - V_{t-1}. \quad (1.2)$$

A portion of this reward-prediction or TD error is used to update the weights that determine the current estimated value. This TD error is the component of the reinforcement-learning models that is thought to be encoded by the phasic firing of dopamine neurons. In the basic TD model, the stimulus is represented as a complete serial compound, which is a version of a tapped delay line. This form of temporal representation assumes that each cue initiates a cascade in which all subsequent time steps in a trial are represented as completely distinct from neighboring time steps. That is, the system is assumed to know exactly how many time steps ago the cue started—an idea adapted from earlier attempts to model rabbit eyeblink

conditioning using TD learning (Desmond & Moore, 1988; Sutton & Barto, 1981, 1990).

Though capturing a wide range of dopamine neuron behavior, these reinforcement-learning models have not dealt adequately with situations when reward timing is varied. The case of reward omission illustrates this problem. After learning, if a reward is omitted, then there is a small but extended reduction in firing rate around the time reward would ordinarily have been delivered (see Figure 1). The complete-serial-compound TD model indeed predicts a negative error at the time reward was expected, but this error occurs exactly at that usual time of reward and is even larger than the positive error earlier in the trial. In fact, the actual decrease in dopaminergic firing covers a greater temporal extent and a smaller maximal decrease than the corresponding TD error (Schultz et al., 1997). The durations of these pauses in dopamine activity are modulated by the magnitude of negative reward-prediction error, a recent observation that eludes the explanatory net of all previous TD models (Bayer, Lau, & Glimcher, 2007). A similar problem arises for this basic TD model when an expected reward is received early (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; see Figure 7 below). Under those conditions, dopamine neurons burst following the early reward and show little change in firing rates around the time reward is ordinarily received. The basic TD model does generate a positive TD error at the time of early reward, but also produces a large negative error exactly at the usual time of reward.

These discrepancies between model and data can mostly be attributed to the choice of the complete serial compound as the temporal stimulus representation in the basic TD model. Given the noisy time perception observed in animals during conditioning (Gibbon, 1977; Lejeune & Wearden, 2006; Smith, 1968; Staddon & Cerutti, 2003), this assumption of a perfect clock is too strong. From the initial publications that discussed the relationship between dopamine and TD learning (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997), the complete serial compound was recognized as unrealistic but has yet to be adequately replaced. Several attempts have been made to extend or modify the TD model to contend with these problematic neurophysiological data, including incorporating resets of the delay line (Suri & Schultz, 1998, 1999), devising alternative learning rules (Brown, Bullock, & Grossberg, 1999; O'Reilly, Frank, Hazy, & Watz, 2007), and switching to partially observable, semi-Markov dynamics (Daw, Courville, & Touretzky, 2006).

In this letter, we explore the computational effects of relaxing certain simplifying assumptions from the basic TD model. Most notably, we propose an alternative temporal stimulus representation that uses the same learning rule as the basic TD model above, but replaces the complete serial compound with a coarsely coded memory trace. In addition, the reward is treated as a detectable stimulus, with properties similar to other cues (cf. Daw et al., 2006). We show how these two simple refinements to the




Figure 2: Stimulus encoding by the microstimuli. From left to right, the stimulus trace, basis functions, and resulting microstimulus levels are displayed. The decaying stimulus trace is approximated by a series of basis functions whose receptive fields are evenly spread across the possible trace height. The decreasing, nonlinear time course of the trace results in microstimuli that get shorter and wider with time. For illustrative purposes, a single basis function (middle) and approximately corresponding microstimulus (right) have been darkened.

basic TD model produce a more realistic computational framework that accords better with the empirical data.

2 The Microstimulus TD Model

2.1 Stimulus Representation. The primary innovation of our model is the introduction of a more sophisticated temporal stimulus representation for use with the TD learning rule. Figure 2 depicts how this stimulus representation is constructed. In the model, the onset of any stimulus, including sensory cues and rewards, is assumed to leave behind a decaying memory trace of that stimulus (left panel). The trace is then encoded by a series of temporal basis functions or receptive fields evenly spaced along the trace height (middle panel). Each basis function encodes how close the current trace is to the center of that receptive field. This proximity measure becomes a feature or microstimulus, which is then input to the TD learning algorithm. In effect, the memory trace is not a single, coherent whole, but is made up of many separate elements with different temporal dynamics.

The right panel of Figure 2 depicts how these microstimulus levels vary across time as the stimulus trace decays. Each subsequent microstimulus becomes progressively wider in time and reaches a lower maximal level. Intuitively, the microstimulus levels represent the degree of confidence that the memory trace has decayed to a certain height, where those levels are determined by the centers of the basis functions. As time elapses from stimulus onset and the memory trace decays, different sets of microstimuli become more or less active, providing a coarse coding of the trace height. The number and width of these microstimuli influence the degree to which discrimination and generalization across the state space (time) occur. The

temporal stimulus representation in our model is, in effect, a relaxation of the assumption of perfectly discrete and distinct temporal features in the complete serial compound. By using overlapping basis functions, we create more graded temporal features that allow for temporal generalization between neighboring time points. All stimuli, including rewards, are assumed to be represented by separate stimulus traces, each with a corresponding set of microstimuli.

For the basis functions, we chose simple gaussians:

$$f(y, \mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{(y - \mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right), \quad (2.1)$$

where y is the input value (i.e., trace height) with μ the center and σ the width of each basis function. The basis functions were uniformly distributed across the height of the memory trace. The selection of the gaussian as the basis function was likely not strictly necessary for this type of model. Other functions, including the traces in spectral timing theory (Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1989) and the behavioral states in the learning to time theory (LeT; Machado, 1997), may produce similar results. We chose this stimulus representation for simplicity and ease of calculation. Given the basis functions, the level of the i th microstimulus $x_t(i)$, at time t , is determined by the corresponding trace heights:

$$x_t(i) = f(y_t, i/m, \sigma), \quad (2.2)$$

where f is the basis function defined above in equation 2.1 and m is the total number of microstimuli per stimulus. The trace height y_t was set to 1 at stimulus onset and decreased exponentially, controlled by a single decay parameter, which was fixed at 0.985 per time step for all stimuli.

2.2 Learning Algorithm. The model learns through the linear TD(λ) algorithm (Sutton, 1988). At each time step, the estimated value is determined by

$$V_t = \mathbf{w}_t^T \mathbf{x}_t = \sum_{i=1}^n w_t(i) x_t(i), \quad (2.3)$$

where \mathbf{x}_t is the vector of microstimulus levels $x_t(i)$, \mathbf{w}_t is a corresponding vector of adjustable weights $w_t(i)$, and n is the total number of all microstimuli. The estimated value is constrained to be nonnegative, with negative values rectified to 0. As in earlier TD models, this estimated value is compared to the reward received and the preceding estimated value to

generate a TD error (δ_t) at each time step (see equation 1.2). This TD error is then used to update the weight vector based on the following update rule,

$$\mathbf{w}_{t+1} = \mathbf{w}_t + \alpha \delta_t \mathbf{e}_t, \quad (2.4)$$

where α is a step-size parameter and \mathbf{e}_t is a vector of eligibility trace levels (Sutton & Barto, 1998), which together help determine the speed of learning. The eligibility traces represent a decaying window of plasticity during which a microstimulus can be learned about (i.e., its weights can be adjusted). Each microstimulus has its own corresponding eligibility trace, which continuously decays, but accumulates whenever that microstimulus is present,

$$\mathbf{e}_{t+1} = \gamma \lambda \mathbf{e}_t + \mathbf{x}_t, \quad (2.5)$$

where γ is the discount factor as above and λ is a decay parameter that determines the plasticity window. The earliest TD models of dopamine all used implicit, one-step eligibility traces (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997), whereby only weights on stimulus components active on the previous time step were updated (i.e., effectively $\lambda = 0$), though more recent work has occasionally incorporated multistep (nonzero) eligibility traces (see Pan, Schmidt, Wickens, & Hyland, 2005).

Our model is completely defined by equations 1.2 and 2.1 to 2.5, the two memory trace parameters (initial height and decay rate), and five additional parameters, which were fixed at the following values for all simulations: $\lambda = 0.95$, $\alpha = 0.01$, $\gamma = 0.98$, $n = 50$, and $\sigma = 0.08$. We used this single set of parameters in an attempt to establish a general correspondence with available empirical findings rather than conducting a set of curve-fitting exercises. In all simulations, 20 time steps were interpreted as a unit of 1 s, and an intertrial interval of 500 time steps separated the onsets of all trials. Preliminary simulations in which we varied these parameters revealed that the general pattern of simulated outcomes was consistent across these manipulations.

3 Results

Five experiments were conducted with the model: simple acquisition, reward omission, partial reinforcement, early reward, and multiple cues. All previous TD models can accommodate the facts of simple acquisition and partial reinforcement (as does ours; see Figures 1, 3, and 6), but the previous models have had varying degrees of success with the other three experiments.




Figure 3: Simple acquisition simulations. TD error (δ ; left column) and value (right column) at each time step on trials 1, 100, and 1000. A cue occurred at time 0, and reward consistently followed exactly 1 s (20 time steps) later.

3.1 Simple Acquisition. During simple acquisition, monkeys are presented with a cue that reliably predicts reward a short time later. At first, their midbrain dopamine neurons show a phasic burst of firing after the reward. Once the cue-reward contingency is well learned, these neurons fire after the earliest cue that predicts reward, but show no deviation from baseline activity when reward is received. Intermediate stages of learning show a mixture of these two end points with midsized responding at both cue onset and reward.

Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of our microstimulus model during simple acquisition (see also Figure 1). The three rows present different stages of training, from the first trial (top row) to near-asymptotic performance after 1000 trials (bottom row). The left column depicts the TD error (δ), and the right column depicts the estimated value (V). In all simulations, the cue was presented at time 0, and reward was delivered 1 s later, on time step 20. At the onset of training, the estimated value was 0, and when the (unexpected) reward was delivered, there was a large, positive TD error. Notice how there was a small upward blip in the estimated value after the reward was received, even on the first trial. This blip is quite informative as to how our model learns: after the reward was received, there was a large, positive TD error, and the weights on eligible microstimuli were duly updated. These microstimuli, however, did not turn off immediately, and thus, on the very next time step, there was an expectation of reward, and the estimated value was no longer 0.

In the middle of training (middle row), there was a midsized error at both cue onset and reward delivery as the model learned a better approximation to the correct value function (see also Pan et al., 2005, and Figure 8).




Figure 4: Reward omission simulations. TD error (δ ; left column) and value (right column) at each time step for an omission trial after 1000 trials of training. A cue occurred at time 0, and reward usually followed exactly 1 s (20 time steps) later.

Notice how there was little TD error at intermediate time points or any visible ramp—a point of contention in the literature for both the empirical data and theoretical models (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003, 2005; Niv, Duff, & Dayan, 2005; O'Reilly et al., 2007; Pan et al., 2005). Finally, by the end of training, the TD error at cue onset remained, but the error at reward delivery had virtually disappeared, though not entirely, as the model learned to correctly predict the occurrence of reward. This full pattern of results roughly matches earlier TD models and corresponds nicely with the empirical data (Schultz et al., 1997; see Figure 1).

3.2 Reward Omission. When a reward is unexpectedly omitted after training, there is a relatively extended period of depressed dopamine neuron firing on these omission trials around the time reward was ordinarily received (e.g., Schultz et al., 1997; see Figure 1). Figure 4 depicts results from the microstimulus TD model in such a reward omission experiment. Training proceeded as in simple acquisition above, except that on the last (1000th) trial, the reward was omitted. As before, there was a relatively large TD error (left panel) at cue onset (time 0), but now there was also a shallow, persistent negative TD error starting around the time reward would ordinarily have been delivered (1 s). The maximal extent of this depression was only about 10% as great as the positive TD error at stimulus onset. This time course of the negative TD error differed considerably from the complete-serial-compound TD model, in which there was a sharp decrease localized to the exact time step when the reward was omitted. In the microstimulus model, the enhanced temporal stimulus representation resulted in a shallow, nonlocalized, yet appropriately timed negative TD error, matching more closely the empirical results from monkeys (Schultz et al., 1997; see also Bayer et al., 2007). The exact quantitative extent (depth and length) of this negative prediction error is parameter dependent with, for example, more numerous or narrower microstimuli producing deeper and shorter negative prediction errors. The qualitative improvement of the




Figure 5: Net reward predictions. Estimated value generated individually by the cue microstimuli (left column), the reward microstimuli (middle column), and their combination (right column) after 1000 trials of training. Arrows indicate the delivery of the cue or conditioned stimulus (CS) at time 0 and reward (R) exactly 1 s (20 time steps) later. Note that the estimated value due to the cue microstimuli is identical to an omission trial and the net estimated value due to the combination of microstimuli is identical to a rewarded trial.

match to empirical data over the basic TD model, however, is independent of particular parameter settings.

The value or reward prediction (see Figure 4, right panel, and see Figure 5) helps explain why the microstimulus model produces this result. Within a trial, at the moment when the reward was omitted, the estimated value did not immediately disappear because the cue microstimuli remained active even beyond the time of ordinary reward (cf. Figure 2). This continued activity of the cue microstimuli resulted in a positive estimated value on omission trials that persisted past the usual time of reward, and thus a persistent negative error when no reward was received. Ordinarily, on rewarded trials, these same cue microstimuli are also active past reward delivery, but the positive reward prediction thereby generated is countered by large, negative weights on the reward microstimuli, resulting in no net value for the time points following reward.

Figure 5 displays this interaction between the values caused by the individual stimuli (cues and rewards). After training, the cue alone (right panel) produced a positive value that extended past the usual time of reward; the reward alone (middle panel), however, produced a negative value that combined with the cue-induced value to produce the net estimated value (right panel) on rewarded trials. When reward was omitted (see Figure 4), however, the balancing force of the reward microstimuli was absent, and the persistent cue microstimuli generated an unimpeded positive value, which gradually declined as the cue microstimuli fell to 0. The decrease in estimated value was small at each time step, repeatedly producing a small negative prediction error until the reward prediction for that trial disappeared. With our microstimulus model, no large negative errors occurred with reward omission, nor would any need to be encoded by dopamine neurons.

3.3 Partial Reinforcement. In an experiment with rewards omitted more frequently, in a partial-reinforcement schedule, a similar pattern of




Figure 6: Partial reinforcement simulations. Empirical data from a representative monkey dopamine neuron (left column) and simulation results from the microstimulus TD model (right two columns). The empirical data and the first column of simulation results (middle column) show rewarded trials, and the final column shows simulation results for omission trials. Each row depicts a different probability of reward; from top to bottom, these probabilities were 0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.00. In the simulations, a cue occurred at 0 s, and reward sometimes followed exactly 1 s (20 time steps) later. Simulated results show the TD error (δ) and are drawn from a single reward or omission trial presented after 500 trials of training with the corresponding probability of reward. (Data are from Fiorillo et al., 2003. Reprinted with permission.)

results emerged (Fiorillo et al., 2003). Figure 6 illustrates the empirical data and simulation results from five different probabilities of reward: 0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.00. The left column shows data from a representative dopamine neuron (Fiorillo et al., 2003); as reward probability increased,

there was an increase in dopamine neuron firing at cue onset and a corresponding decrease in firing at reward delivery. After 500 trials of training, the microstimulus model (middle column) showed a similar pattern of results for rewarded trials. There was a TD error at cue onset that was proportional to the probability of reward and a TD error at reward delivery that was inversely proportional to that probability. On omission trials (right column in Figure 6), the model showed a small, temporally extended negative TD error around the usual time of reward. This negative error was also proportional to the probability of reward and covered a slightly smaller time span (though still extended) with lower reward probabilities.

This pattern of results emerged mostly because the learned value (or predicted future reward) was scaled by the probability of reward. With higher probabilities of reward, the model expected more reward in the future when the cue was present, leading to a larger jump in value (and TD error) at cue onset, but a smaller reward-prediction error when the reward was actually delivered. When reward was omitted, the value was lower with the smaller probabilities, and the corresponding negative error was shallower and also covered a shorter temporal extent (cf. Bayer et al., 2007). These two facets of the negative error had different causes: the shallower negative error occurred because the value was scaled by reward probability and therefore decreased more slowly. The shorter temporal extent stemmed from the frequency of omission trials; with more frequent nonrewarded trials, the temporal accuracy of the reward prediction on those trials actually improved as the system relied less on the reward microstimuli (see Figure 5) and more on the cue microstimuli alone, resulting in more temporally concentrated negative errors. Even with the repeated reward omission (reward probabilities less than 1.00), our microstimulus model continued to show small, extended negative errors because the chosen microstimulus representation was not complete and a perfectly timed reward prediction could not be learned even at asymptote. Here, too, there were no TD errors at intermediate time points or any visible ramp in the error time course (Fiorillo et al., 2003, 2005; Niv et al., 2005). As suggested by Fiorillo et al. (2005), altering the temporal stimulus representation can indeed eliminate the interim backpropagating TD errors noted by Niv et al. (2005).

3.4 Early Reward. When rewards were occasionally presented earlier than usual, dopamine neurons responded immediately after the unpredicted early reward, but showed little change from baseline firing rates at the usual reward delivery time (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998). Our microstimulus model better simulates this empirical outcome than does the previous complete-serial-compound models. Figure 7 presents results from the two TD models for early reward trials. We simulated 1000 trials with reward occurring at the usual time and then a further 15 probe trials containing an early reward. Contrary to the empirical data, the complete-serial-compound model predicted a large negative error and




Figure 7: Early reward simulations. TD error (δ) for the complete-serial-compound TD model (left column) and both TD error (δ) and value for the microstimulus TD model (right two columns) for 15 early reward probe trials after 1000 trials of training. A cue occurred at time 0, and reward followed either 0.5 s (probe) or 1 s (nonprobe) later. Simulation results are displayed for the first (top row) and last (bottom row) probes.

thus a depression in dopamine firing at the time that reward was usually received. For the microstimulus model, however, on the first probe trial (top row), there was indeed a small negative error around the usual time of reward, the same as with reward omission. The maximum depth of this negative error was only half the maximal depth of the negative error on omission trials because the reward microstimuli gained negative weights even during normal acquisition, depressing the estimated value during the postreward period (as can be seen in the right panels in Figure 7; see also Figure 5, middle panel). By the final probe trial (bottom row), the microstimulus model had quickly learned to correct for the missing reward, and the already small negative TD errors were virtually eliminated. The available empirical data are inconclusive as to whether neural spiking at the former time of reward reliably changes across these first few early-reward trials (see Figure 6 in Hollerman & Schultz, 1998). In contrast, the complete-serial-compound model predicts a large, sharp negative TD error at the usual time of reward, even after repeated early-reward trials (bottom left).

In addition to determining neural activity at the former time of reward, a novel, testable prediction from our model arises from the manner in which the reward microstimuli limit negative prediction errors on early-reward trials (see Figure 7, right panel). Even on the very first trials with early reward, the reward microstimuli had negative weights and sharply reduced the net value for the time steps following reward delivery. As the middle panel of Figure 5 shows, the negative value attributable to the reward microstimuli was most pronounced on the time steps immediately following

the reward and gradually tapered off. As a result, the reduction of the estimated value at the usual time of reward due to the reward microstimuli should be correlated with how early that reward arrives: the earlier the reward, the smaller the reduction in the estimated value. If the reward comes only moderately early (approximately 90% of the usual interval), there would be little net value at the usual time of reward because there would be strong negative weights on the shortest reward microstimuli. Thus, there would be virtually no TD error and, accordingly, no expected dopamine response. In contrast, very early rewards (approximately 10% of the usual interval) would produce large reward predictions at the usual time of reward because the suppressive effects of the reward microstimuli on the net value would have faded away. Thus, the model predicts an extended, negative TD error in this situation, similar to that expected for and observed on omission trials (see Figure 4). The complete-serial-compound TD model, however, would predict a large negative prediction error at the exact time of reward for both these situations.

3.5 Multiple Cues. When multiple sequential cues precede reward during conditioning, both the TD error and dopamine burst percolate back to the earliest reliable predictor of the reward (Pan et al., 2005; Sutton & Barto, 1981, 1990; see also Kehoe, Schreurs & Graham, 1987). Figure 8 depicts this finding in the empirical data (left column) from rat dopamine neurons (Pan et al., 2005) as well as corresponding simulations from our microstimulus TD model. The top rows present data from early in training (after 50 trials in the simulations), and the bottom rows depict data from late in training (after 1000 trials in the simulations). In the trials with both predictive cues present (first and third rows), there were positive peaks and bursts at the onsets of both cues as well as the reward (though the latter two were muted late in training). Moreover, omitting the second cue (second and fourth rows in Figure 8) produced a drastic increase in neural firing following reward delivery. Finally, early in training (top row), there was response to both the initial cue and the reward, a result taken as evidence for nonzero eligibility traces in the complete-serial-compound TD model (Pan et al., 2005).

In agreement with these findings, our microstimulus model produced a persistent, positive TD error at the time of the second cue as well as an enhanced positive TD error to the reward when that second cue was omitted (see the middle column of Figure 8). Both results occurred because of the nature of the temporal generalization in our model. The microstimulus representation treats nearby time points similarly, and thus our model cannot perfectly predict the time of reward. Because the microstimuli grow wider over time, the degree of that imperfection increases with the time between cue onset and reward. Thus, in the multiple cue experiment, the later cue allowed for better prediction of reward timing because of its relative proximity to the reward, leading to a distinct bump in the estimated value (right column) and associated TD error (middle column) at cue onset. When the second cue




Figure 8: Multiple cue simulations. Empirical data (left column) from rat dopamine neurons and TD error (middle column) and value (right column) from microstimulus TD model simulations in an experiment with multiple predictive cues. Two cues (double arrows) were presented in sequence before the reward (single arrow/line); the first cue occurred at time 0 with the second cue and reward usually following 2 and 3 s later, respectively. The top two rows show results from early in training (50 trials in the simulations), and the bottom two rows show results from late in training (1000 trials in the simulations). The first and third rows show results when both cues and the reward were presented. The second and fourth rows show results when the second cue was omitted (indicated with an asterisk). (Data are reprinted from Figure 3 in Pan et al., 2005. Reprinted with permission.)

was omitted, the reward prediction stemming from that cue's microstimuli was absent, leading to a smaller estimated value at the time of reward (right column) and a larger TD error on reward delivery (middle column).

Pan et al. (2005) concluded that to be consistent with their results, the complete-serial-compound model would require multistep eligibility traces ($\lambda > 0$) and a low step size (α). In the microstimulus model, we found that

neither of these parameter choices was necessary. The temporally extended nature of the microstimuli allows the reward prediction to generalize to the first few time points after only a handful of trials. Even with much larger step sizes ($\alpha \geq .5$) and one-step eligibility traces ($\lambda = 0$), we found qualitatively similar results (simulations not shown). Thus, as Pan et al. (2005) originally suggested, their conclusion about the necessity of nonzero eligibility traces is indeed contingent on the use of the complete-serial-compound stimulus representation; other stimulus representations, such as our microstimuli, provide an alternative mechanism for modeling their data without requiring certain parameter settings.

Our microstimulus model makes a unique, testable prediction about a similar multicue experiment if the training protocol is varied to resemble a blocking experiment (Kamin, 1969; Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001). In such an experiment, as in Pan et al. (2005), multiple sequential cues precede reward, but the second, later cue is inserted only after extensive training with the early cue. Other TD models using the complete-serial-compound stimulus representation, including the modified model of Pan et al. (2005), predict blocking of the dopamine response to the second cue (cf. Waelti et al., 2001). In these models, for the sequential two-cue experiment of Pan et al. (2005; see Figure 8), the continued TD error to the second cue occurs because the learning algorithm divides credit for the prediction error equally between the two stimulus components (one from each cue) active during their shared time steps following the onset of the second cue. In the proposed experiment, in contrast, the first cue is pretrained, so the reward is already perfectly predicted when the second cue is introduced. The perfect prediction in the complete-serial-compound model results in no prediction errors, and thus no learning about the second cue and complete blocking. In our microstimulus model, the reward is never perfectly predicted because of the limited temporal resolution of the stimulus representation. The model learns about the second cue to the extent that this second cue improves the temporal accuracy of the reward prediction. Thus, we do not expect this sort of complete blocking effect to exist, except when the cue onsets coincide (Waelti et al., 2001; see also Barnet, Grahame, & Miller, 1993; Kehoe, Schreurs, & Amodei, 1981; Kehoe et al., 1987). According to our model, a dopamine response to the onset of the second cue should emerge, as occurred in the latter stages of the experiment depicted in Figure 8 (Pan et al., 2005).

4 Discussion

In this letter, we provide a novel temporal stimulus representation for use with TD models of the dopamine system. Our model makes more realistic assumptions about stimulus representation and offers a better fit to the extant empirical data on dopamine neuron firing. We also adduce

several new testable predictions about the behavior of dopamine neurons in experiments with early rewards or multiple sequential cues.

Our microstimulus TD model makes two related theoretical improvements over earlier models that rely on the complete serial compound for stimulus representation (e.g., Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997). Each of these changes represents a relaxation of certain assumptions from the earlier TD models. Most prominently, we replace the perfect timing of the complete serial compound with graded microstimuli that provide temporal generalization across nearby time points. In addition, we accord these microstimuli to all events in the environment, including rewards, not only those preselected as conditioned stimuli. We have shown how these refined assumptions improve the model's correspondence to extant data in a variety of experiments while retaining the simple explanatory power that TD models provide.

The microstimuli in the model, though strictly deterministic, capture one potential source of timing noise: that caused by generalization across nearby time points within a single trial. This temporal generalization could be regarded as a limitation of the sensory temporal perception or an effective strategy for dealing with a noisy world (where perfectly fixed intervals of the sort that dominate these experiments are quite rare). The microstimuli, however, do not address the further question of how to model trial-to-trial variability in timed responding, an issue of considerable importance in the animal learning literature (see Gibbon, 1977; Lejeune & Wearden, 2006; Staddon & Cerutti, 2003). The published literature on dopamine neuron responding does not, to our knowledge, contain data that would adequately constrain further assumptions about trial-to-trial timing stochasticity. We expect that future theoretical and empirical efforts will shed further light on this topic.

Throughout this work, our modeling approach has been to emphasize the ideas and focus on qualitative matches with known experimental findings rather than engage in a series of curve-fitting exercises to optimize the parameters for each experiment. As a result, though dealing very well with the qualitative features of the data, our microstimulus TD model as presented does not produce a perfect match in all cases. For example, in the multiple cue experiment (see Figure 8), the peak in TD error following the second cue late in training is probably too small and not noticeably different from the peak in TD error following reward. In this instance, the data were collected in experiments with a different species (rats) from the monkey experiments shown in Figures 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7. Given the large differences in the experimental protocol between these studies, we could quite reasonably have used a moderately higher discount rate (γ), thereby increasing the TD error at both cues and further increasing the correspondence with the empirical data. Nonetheless, we would still not expect, nor desire, perfect quantitative matches to individual data sets.

Although the earliest TD models of dopamine relied on a complete serial compound for the temporal stimulus representation (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Sutton & Barto, 1990), several subsequent models have also attempted to replace those early representational assumptions. For example, Suri and Schultz (1998, 1999) present a model that uses a sequence of broadening components to represent stimuli. On the surface, these stimulus components resemble the microstimuli of our model but serve a wholly different functional role. In their model, learning occurs only when a particular component is descending; the model is constrained so that only one component can be descending on each time step, thus creating, in effect, a complete serial compound and being bound by the limitations of that representation. Our stimulus representation more closely resembles the traces in spectral timing theory (Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1989) and the behavioral states of the learning to time theory (LeT; Machado, 1997) than the stimulus components in the Suri and Schultz (1998, 1999) model.

More recently, Daw et al. (2006) addressed many of the same empirical lacunae in the reinforcement learning and dopamine story with a computational model based on partial observability and semi-Markov dynamics. Their theory, though elegant and comprehensive, requires a full world model for implementation, thereby losing much of the explanatory force that comes from the simple, mechanistic, incremental account of the dopaminergic system provided by TD models. Our microstimulus theory sticks much more closely to the established TD models, but makes significant changes in the stimulus representation.

Several recent discussions of the relationship between dopamine and reward-prediction errors have emphasized that the low baseline levels of dopaminergic firing do not allow dopamine to adequately code for negative errors (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Bayer et al., 2007; Daw et al., 2006; Niv et al., 2005; Pan et al., 2005). Consequently, dopamine may only encode a rectified reward-prediction error with the negative portion of the error encoded by another neurotransmitter, such as serotonin (Daw, Kakade, & Dayan, 2002). Our results limit the necessity of this additional error-encoding scheme in experiments where rewards are omitted or mistimed. As clearly depicted in Figures 4, 6, and 7, there need be no large negative TD errors in these situations if a form of temporal generalization is introduced into the stimulus representation, as in our model. In partial empirical support of this point, Bayer et al. (2007) recently showed that the phasic pausing in dopamine responding can indeed encode a range of negative reward-prediction errors. Though there would still seem to be situations where large, punctate negative reward-prediction errors should exist (perhaps punishment or conditioned inhibition), our model limits the range of experimental conditions for which a secondary error-encoding system is required.

Our microstimulus model makes two empirically testable predictions about dopamine responding that test each of the two fundamental tenets

of the model. First, the assumption that stimuli are represented as a set of graded microstimuli leads directly to the prediction that strong blocking should occur only when cue onsets coincide. If, after training, a second cue is inserted between the initial cue and reward, this cue would also begin to cause a TD error and should elicit a burst of dopamine responding. Second, the assumption that rewards act like other cues and produce their own microstimuli leads to the prediction that the degree of dopamine responding should depend on the exact timing of an early reward. With a moderately early reward, the model predicts no difference from baseline responding at the usual time of reward, whereas with a very early reward, the model predicts a shallow negative error—similar to that observed on omission trials (see Figure 4). This latter prediction about the effects of very early rewards also differs from that of newer extensions of the TD model; both the models of Suri and Schultz (1999) and Daw et al. (2006) would expect no negative prediction error at the usual time of reward regardless of how early the reward arrives. In the Suri and Schultz (1999) model, the very early reward would still reset the stimulus representation, eliminating all subsequent value for that trial, and in the Daw et al. (2006) model, the very early reward would still precipitate a transition to the ITI state.

Timing is a vital part of any organism's environment and behavioral repertoire. Predicting when a reward will happen and acting accordingly are crucial for adaptive performance. Our microstimulus TD model provides a solution to part of this temporal prediction problem and matches the empirical data better than the basic, complete-serial-compound TD model. In the future, we expect this temporal stimulus representation to be further refined and used for action selection as part of a model for explaining the conditioning behavior of an entire animal.

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